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11 Introduction
During the last decade or so, a number of Latin American countries experi-
enced severe ﬁnancial and currency crises, from Mexico in 1994 to Argentina
in 2001. Debt sustainability problems have been a crucial issue in all of
these episodes of distress. Even when a country’s foreign debt exposure was
relatively low, the structure of its sovereign bonds made it vulnerable to
speculative attack or any other ﬁnancial market turbulence. In the spring of
2002, a strong currency depreciation and a sudden and sharp rise in sovereign
bond spreads put Brazil under strain, by severely impacting upon its indexed
debt, despite the important reforms of the previous years and the relative
sound fundamentals.
The ﬁnancial turmoil generated by the change in the economic environ-
ment appeared to be the result of a shift in market equilibria, from stability
to crisis. The fact that the crisis occurred in the run-up to the Brazilian
presidential elections in October 2002, coupled with the concerns expressed
by some ﬁnancial commentators relating to the expected victory of the so-
cialist candidate, Lula da Silva, a former trade unionist known for his past
declarations on debt repudiation, has led authors such as Williamson (2002)
to interpret the Brazilian experience as a ﬁnancial distress episode triggered
by uncertainty on the political outcome. In contrast, very little attention
has been devoted to the contemporaneous crisis in Argentina as a possible
explanation of the Brazilian turmoil. The Argentine debt crisis has been
mainly regarded as an entirely predictable and independent event, unable
to inﬂuence the other economies of the region apart from marginal ﬁnancial
spillovers1. Some authors — e.g. Miller et al. (2003) — have, however, sug-
gested a role for the Argentine crisis and, more generally, of its underlying
political events in coordinating public expectations concerning the behavior
of a possible left-wing government in Brazil.
This paper aims to investigate the events of 2002 in Brazil, by testing
empirically some of the interpretations recently proposed by the theoretical
literature on the subject. In light of the literature on catalytic ﬁnance and
recent work by Corsetti et al. (2002) and Morris and Shin (2003), we also
address the role of IMF intervention on investor sentiment. Finally, we con-
sider the eﬀect of global factors in the Brazilian turmoil. In particular, we
look for evidence of a contemporaneous increase in global risk aversion as a
potential threat to the vulnerable Brazilian economy during this period.
Building on previous work on contagion by Jeanne and Masson (1998)
and Fratzscher (2002) as well as the econometric literature on business cycles
1See Krueger [2002].
2(Filardo and Gordon, 1998), we apply a time-varying transition probability
Markov-switching model to the analysis. We ﬁnd the use of such methodology
particularly useful in detecting shifts in regime and ﬁnd that its performance
is superior to simple linear models. In contrast to previous work on this
issue, we employ high-frequency ﬁnancial data, as they seem better able to
capture shifts in investors’ behaviour. Speciﬁcally, we use sovereign bond
spreads as a proxy for country default risk. We assess the existence of a
political “mistrust eﬀect” for the left-wing candidate by means of an opinion
polls variable and create an IMF dummy variable in order to capture any
catalytic eﬀect arising from both positive and negative news from the IMF
or domestic politicians. We test for both ﬁnancial and political contagion
between Argentina and Brazil by extending the analysis to Argentine data.
Finally, we account for a global factor eﬀect by introducing into the empirical
model the high-yield spread in developed markets.
The empirical results strongly support the hypothesis of a shift in regimes
in Brazil during 2002, and indicate the political instability of the pre-electoral
period and the global increase in market risk aversion as main causes of the
jump in equilibria. Negative news concerning IMF intervention also has a
signiﬁcant impact on the probability of shifting between regimes. Argen-
tine country risk, however, aﬀects only the extent of the Brazilian turmoil,
without triggering it.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II reviews the
main events in Brazil during the summer of 2002 and the problem of public
debt sustainability. Section III addresses the main interpretations of the 2002
events with reference to the current economic debate and the recent literature
on ﬁnancial crises. Section IV presents the Markov-switching methodology
adopted in the analysis. Section V discusses the main empirical results of
the model. Section VI concludes.
2 The Depreciation of the Brazilian Real of
2002 and the Problem of Debt Sustainabil-
ity
In the summer of 2002, the Brazilian economy was subject to major currency
turmoil with a depreciation of its currency, the real,o fo v e r3 0 %be t w e e nA p r i l
and October (see Figure. 1). The exchange rate disorder was associated with
a net drop in capital inﬂows, a sharp rise in the interest rate spreads of Brazil-
ian debt over US Treasury securities, and a fall in domestic debt rollovers.
This turbulence has been interpreted as the result of ﬁnancial market fears
3that Brazil could default on its public debt, following the example of other
emerging markets and especially that of its closest neighbour, Argentina.














































Figure 1: Nominal Exchange Rate and Bond Spreads
Sources: DataStream, JP Morgan (EMBI Global)
In the years preceding this ﬁnancial distress episode, however, the Brazil-
ian authorities had achieved a substantial improvement in the country’s
institutional framework: the 1998 Fiscal Stabilisation Plan2 and the 2000
Fiscal Responsibility Law–as well as the greater transparency that came
with the publication of improved government statistics and the recognition
of ﬁscal hidden liabilities–being among the most relevant reforms3.S i n c e
1995, the ﬁscal balances had registered signiﬁcant primary surpluses averag-
ing about 3.5% of GDP and high levels of ﬁscal revenue had been collected.
T h em a c r o e c o n o m i ce n v i r o n m e n ta l s ob e n e ﬁt e df r o ma ne ﬀective inﬂation-
targeting policy, which delivered relatively stable inﬂation in spite of the large
currency depreciation. With respect to the trade position, the competitive
exchange rate allowed an improvement of the current account balance (Figure
2). These outcomes are even more remarkable in light of the deteriorating
macroeconomic situation in neighbouring Argentina, Brazil’s single-largest
trading partner4: it is, in fact, estimated that Brazilian exports to new mar-
kets were able to oﬀset more than 80% of the drop in exports to Argentina.
This economic framework seems at ﬁrst sight to contain all the neces-
sary ingredients for a successful trend in Brazilian fundamentals, speciﬁcally
2This law governs the spending patterns of the country’s federal states, by establishing
limits on public indebtedness or expenditure in personnel, and deﬁning annual ﬁscal targets
for three successive years.
3See Goldfajn [2002].
4The weight of the Argentine peso in the real eﬀective exchange rate calculated by
Banco do Brasil is equal to 15.8% (second only to the US dollar with 32.4%) and reﬂects
trade during the period 1998-2001.
4with regard to debt dynamics. On the basis of these results and of a consis-
tent medium and long-term scenario, an IMF ﬁscal sustainability analysis,
released in January 2001, estimated a gradual net public debt decline over
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Figure 2: Real exchange rates and trade dynamics
Sources: Banco Central do Brasil, IFS
Nevertheless, these positive signals were unable to quell investors’ con-
cerns over the sustainability of Brazilian debt. In fact, the vulnerability of the
Brazilian economy to shifts in investor sentiment and other external shocks
depended critically on the composition of its public sector debt. Increased
volatility in emerging markets in previous years, coupled with Brazil’s past
history of monetary and ﬁscal mismanagement, led to a strong demand for
indexed debt from foreign as well as domestic investors. As a result, begin-
ning with the East Asian crisis in 1997, a large share of preﬁxed Brazilian
public debt had been converted into indexed debt. As depicted in Figure 3,
the share of public debt with a ﬂoating interest rate5 (37% of the total) or
linked to the exchange rate (42%) represented a major source of vulnerability
for the country. As a result, panic behaviour in the summer of 2002 was more
than suﬃcient to oﬀset the eﬀorts of the Brazilian authorities: any hostile
market sentiment was self-validated by the rise in bond spreads and depre-
ciation of the currency, which pushed the debt-to-GDP ratio up to around
56% by end-20026.
5The Selic is the overnight interest rate that is set by the Brazilian Central Bank.
6Williamson [2002] regards the 56% ﬁgure declared by the Brazilian CB as too low and
takes this ﬁgure up to 66%. Goldstein [2003] reports similar estimates for major rating
agency and investment banks. Favero and Giavazzi [2002] remark on the existence of
hidden liabilities that are still not oﬃcially recognised and that may account for as much
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Figure 3: Composition of Brazilian Public-Sector Total Debt (Aug-2002)
Sources: Williamson [2002], Banco Central do Brasil.
3 Financial Contagion and Political Uncer-
tainty
3.1 A Multiple Equilibria Story?
The 2002 currency panic in many ways resembles a self-fulﬁlling crisis episode,
a so p p o s e dt oa“ w a k e - u pc a l l ”e ﬀect, where an external event reveals to in-
vestors the true state of the fundamentals. In eﬀect, the ﬁscal situation of
Brazil in 2001 was far from unsustainable; yet the level of public debt and,
in particular, its ﬂexible structure were not adequate to keep the economy in
the no-crisis state and left it vulnerable to shifts in investors’ expectations.
As described by second-generation crisis models,7 when an economy is
exposed to multiple equilibria, sunspots–i.e. factors able to coordinate and
redirect investors’ expectations–can induce jumps between them. Such a
mechanism is enabled only within a certain range of the fundamentals nec-
essary to place the country in the crisis zone: low reserves, a negative trade
balance and/or a large variable debt, as in the Brazilian case, are among the
most likely causes of vulnerability. According to this theoretical framework,
it follows that, given its ﬁscal situation, Brazil had two alternative stable
equilibria: a “good” equilibrium, characterised by constant capital inﬂows,
relatively low interest rates, a stabilisation of the exchange rate and, as a
result, a manageable ﬁscal burden; and a “bad” equilibrium, characterised
by diminished foreign investment, high interest rates, an over-depreciated
currency and a far from sustainable debt-service ﬁgure.
Nevertheless, recent work on currency crises by Morris and Shin (1998)
has focused attention on the role of uncertainty and lack of common knowl-
edge. In these models, the introduction of noisy private information about
fundamentals eliminates any common device able to coordinate investors’
7See the seminal paper of second-generation crisis models by Obstfeld (1996) or, for a
text-book treatment, Sarno and Taylor (2002).
6actions and leads eventually, by iterated elimination in a global-game frame-
work, to selection of a unique equilibrium. Morris and Shin (2001) (and Prati
and Sbracia, 2003) extend this analysis in order to distinguish between diﬀer-
ent sources of uncertainty (fundamental and strategic) as well as a diﬀerent
taxonomy of information (private or publicly available). The result is a con-
dition for uniqueness of equilibrium which relies strongly on the precision of
private signals relative to the underlying uncertainty on the fundamentals.
From this perspective, the Brazilian events of 2002 may have been caused
by a shift in fundamentals, where each agent takes a global perspective and
deduces when an adequate number of other players is ready to attack the cur-
rency. This scenario needs by assumption to focus on the noisy character of
the surrounding public signals. In particular, with reference to the presiden-
tial campaign in Brazil during 2002, uncertainty over economic fundamentals
could include uncertainty over “political fundamentals”, assessed by agents
according to their correlated private signals together with the noisy public
signals in the form of public opinion polls.
Notice, however, that if the strength and direction of common signals
overcame the precision of private information, we would be brought back to
a multiple-equilibria scenario,8 where sunspots are replaced by increases in
the noise of individuals’ signals.9 Following this latter interpretation, the
precision of private information may have been further compromised by the
vulnerable character of indexed Brazilian debt, since under indexation a rise
in the sovereign spread will actually increase the size of the debt, which may
in turn adversely aﬀect market sentiment in a vicious spiral.
4 Modelling Crisis in a Nonlinear Framework
4.1 Nonlinear Analysis of International Financial Mar-
kets: A Brief Review
The use of linear models in the analysis of ﬁnancial time series presents a
number of limitations, as their formulation does not allow for the existence of
unobservable factors (such as changes in investors’ beliefs, herding behaviour,
ﬁnancial panic and political uncertainty) that are likely to aﬀect the process
under investigation. For this reason, nonlinear empirical analyses of ﬁnan-
cial and international ﬁnancial variables have become increasingly popular
over the last decade or so. In particular, Markov-switching (MS) models
8See Hellwig (2002).
9Heinemann and Illing (2002).
7represent a valuable tool for the purposes of the present analysis.10 Their
attractiveness in the context of the present analysis are clear: As MS models
are designed explicitly to capture discontinuity in the data-generating pro-
cess, they allow us to model regime changes due to a structural alteration
in the economic system as well as extraordinary short-period events such as
a ﬁnancial turmoil episode. Moreover, by allowing the estimation method
to determine the probability of being in any particular regime, we can avoid
the ap r i o r iidentiﬁcation of regimes and their timing, thereby enhancing the
extent of ﬂexibility in the analysis.
Given these attractive features, it is not surprising that the empirical
literature on ﬁnancial crises and contagion reveals a growing interest in the
use of this category of models. The work of Jeanne and Masson (1998), who
propose the utilization of a MS framework in order to depict empirically the
existence of multiple equilibria, represents one of the ﬁrst attempts in this
vein. Speciﬁcally, these authors test a model of self-fulﬁlling expectations
in the speculation episode against the French franc in the period 1992-1993.
Their results show that the performance of the model improves signiﬁcantly
once sunspots are introduced to inﬂuence devaluation expectations, by means
of a MS approach. In Masson (1999), however, some limitations in the use of
MSVAR to the analysis of contagion are discussed: in particular, the appli-
cation of MS analysis to interest rates for Argentina and Brazil seems not to
produce the expected results. Among the main problems identiﬁed by Mas-
son is the availability of an adequate data sample: the use of high frequency
data and the analysis of large asset price movements rather than crises per se
are suggested as possible alternatives. Fratzscher (2002) employs a MSVAR
methodology to allow for a systematic comparison of the possible explana-
tions of ﬁnancial crises: fundamentals, sunspots and contagion. Fratzscher’s
empirical study is based on monthly data from 24 emerging markets over
the period 1986-1998. Only the inclusion of contagion variables–measuring
trade, ﬁnancial and stock market interdependence across countries—allows the
linear model to perform as well as the nonlinear one, suggesting the eﬀective-
ness of MS modelling in the detection of latent, crisis-generating factors. The
MS methodology is applied to high-frequency data by Sola et al. (2002) in
order to account for changes in expectations and investors’ beliefs in the test
of volatility spillovers across stock markets. Finally, Tillmann (2003) adopts
a time-varying regime-switching regression in order to model the probability
of a currency crisis for the French franc and the Italian lira under the ERM.
In particular, the model tests for the theoretical predictions of models àl a
Morris and Shin (1998), by introducing a measure of information disparities.
10For a wide coverage of Markov switching models refer to Kim and Nelson [1999].
84.2 A Markov-Switching Model of Crisis with Endoge-
nous Transition Probabilities
In the present analysis, we use the Brazilian sovereign bond spread as a
proxy for the perceived risk of default, and estimate an equation explaining
the behaviour of this equation that has a Markov-switching mean, in order
to capture the presence of an immediate jump of the series vector to its new
level11. The model we consider is therefore of the form:
BRSPRt = α0 + α1St + β
0xt + εt, εt˜N(0,σ
2), (1)
where BRSPRt denotes the Brazilian spread, α0 and α1 are scalar parame-
ters, xt is a vector of variables that inﬂuence the level of the spread, β is an
associated vector of coeﬃcients and εt is a white-noise disturbance term. In
this setup, a shift into crisis is represented by a shift from the ‘normal state’,
where St =0and the intercept term is just α0, to the crisis state, where
St =1and the intercept term becomes α0 + α1 so that (assuming α1 > 0)a
higher level of the sovereign spread is indicated, for any given values of xt.
In the standard MS model, the probabilities of switching between regimes
are assumed to be constant and exogenous. In the present analysis, however,
we want to extend this approach in order to examine whether the probability
of being in a crisis state is dependent upon one or more of a range of variables,
as discussed above. Following Filardo and Gordon (1998), we can model these
probabilities using a latent variable probit model, such that
Pr{St =1 } =P r {S
∗
t ≥ 0}, (2)
where S∗
t is a latent variable deﬁned by the following equation
S
∗
t = γ0 + γ1St−1 + δ
0zt + ut, (3)
in which zt is a vector of variables that inﬂuence the transition probability
with corresponding factor loadings determined by the δ vector of parameters,
γ0 and γ1 are scalar parameters and ut is a standard normally distributed
11The same indicators estimated in a simple linear framework are not signiﬁcant, with
the only exception of the Argentine spreads. The variables of the linear model, whose
results we omit for brevity, are estimated in diﬀerences, as integrated of order one and not
cointegrated. However, the same variables are found stationary at 10% critical level once
structural breaks are accounted for, following the testing methodology by Perron (1990).
This result justiﬁes the use of levels in the Markov switching speciﬁcation.
9white-noise disturbance.12 The transition probabilities can then be derived
by evaluating the conditional cumulative distribution function for ut.S p e c i f -
ically, if the probability of the economy remaining in the crisis state at time
t once it is in crisis (St−1 =1 ), given the values of zt,i spcc
t ,t h e n
p
cc
t =P r {St =1 |St−1 =1 ,z t} =P r{ut ≥− γ0 − γ1 − δ
0zt}
=1 − Φ[−γ0 − γ1 − δ
0zt] (4)
where Φ[.] denotes the standard normal cumulative density function. Sim-
ilarly, the probability of remaining in the tranquil state at time t,g i v e nzt
(and, of course, St−1 =0 ) may be written:
p
ττ
t =P r {St =0 |St−1 =0 ,z t} =P r{ut < −γ0 − δ
0zt}
= Φ[−γ0 − δ
0zt] (5)
Note that the probability of switching from state i to state j (i,j =
c,τ,w h e r ec denotes the crisis state and τ denotes the tranquil state) is
straightforwardly given by p
ij
t =1 − p
ii
t (i,j = c,τ).
Estimation of the time-invariant parameter vector (α0,α1,β
0,γ0,γ1,δ
0,σ2)0,




can be carried out in a Bayesian context using an application of the Gibbs
sampler,13 as suggested by Filardo and Gordon (1998). We followed the
Gibbs-sampling methodology, although we employ diﬀuse priors for all of
the parameters so that the resulting estimator is in fact equivalent to a stan-
dard maximum likelihood estimator.14
Of course, application of the model requires selecting a list of candidate
variables to include in xt and zt. Given the previous discussion, we considered
the developed market high-yield as a proxy for global factors, the Argentine
sovereign spread as a potential indicator of the contagion eﬀect, opinion polls
relating to the popularity of the left-wing candidate in the 2002 Brazilian
presidential elections, Lula de Silva, as a proxy for a “political mistrust”
variable, and an “aid and commitment” variable designed to capture positive
and negative declarations by the IMF concerning possible or agreed support
programs to Brazil or Argentina during this period. In the next sections we
further justify the use of these variables, while more detailed descriptions are
given in the data appendix.
12Normalising the variance of ut is an identifying assumption that can be imposed
without loss of generality.
13Albert and Chib (1993) suggest applying the Gibbs sampler to estimation of Markov-
switching models with ﬁxed transition probabilities.
14Convergence of the Gibbs sampler was achieved by using 10,000 passes, with the ﬁrst
1,000 discarded.
104.3 Global Factors: the Developed Market High-Yield
Spread
There are at least two reasons why one might expect the developed market
high-yield spread–the spread between the return on less-than-investment-
grade (“junk”) bonds and government or other highly rated bonds–to have
an eﬀect on emerging markets. The ﬁr s ti st h a tm o v e m e n t si nt h eh i g h -
yield spread may be a countercyclical leading indicator of economic activity
in developed markets, so that a rise in the spread may presage a reduction
in economic activity with a concomitant adverse eﬀect on capital ﬂows to
emerging markets. The second is that the wedge between the return on
high-yield bonds and investment-grade bonds must, more generally, reﬂect
the general attitude towards risk of investors at that point in time–the bigger
the wedge, the greater the degree of risk aversion and the less willing will
investors be to invest in emerging markets, other things equal.
The idea that the high-yield spread may be a countercyclical leading
indicator of economic activity derives from the theory of the ﬁnancial accel-
erator.15 While the ﬁner details of ﬁnancial accelerator models diﬀer, their
central features are reasonably uniform and their key elements may be set out
informally as follows: There is some friction present in the ﬁnancial market,
such as asymmetric information or costs of contract enforcement, which, for
a wide class of industrial and commercial businesses, introduces a wedge be-
tween the cost of external funds and the opportunity cost of internal funds–
the “premium for external funds”. This premium is an endogenous variable,
which depends inversely on the balance-sheet strength of the borrower, since
the balance sheet is the key signal through which the creditworthiness of the
ﬁrm is evaluated. However, balance-sheet strength is itself a positive func-
tion of aggregate real economic activity, so that borrowers’ ﬁnancial positions
are procyclical and hence movements in the premium for external funds are
countercyclical. Thus, as real activity expands, the premium on external
funds declines, which, in turn, leads to an ampliﬁcation of borrower spend-
ing, which further accelerates the expansion of real activity. This is the basic
mechanism of the ﬁnancial accelerator. In line with the predictions of the
theory, Gertler and Lown (1999) and Mody and Taylor (2003) ﬁnd evidence
of a strongly signiﬁcant and negative relationship between the US high-yield
spread and US real activity.
With reference to the Brazilian events under investigation, the credit
crunch and the depressed real activity in developed markets associated also
with the Enron scandal and the related worries about ﬁrm accountability,
15See for example Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) and the references therein.
11may have generated serious spillovers into developing markets. In particular,
the global portfolio rebalancing across classes of investment risk, due to in-
creased risk aversion, pushed up the bond rates of the major Latin American
economies. Figure 4 shows how the trends of the Brazilian sovereign spread
and the and index of developing countries’ high-yield spread show quite a
similar pattern, especially during the 2002 turmoil. However, the extent of
the increase in the developed market high-yield spread seems able to explain
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Figure 4: Developed-Market High-Yield and Brazilian Sovereign Spreads
Source: JPMorgan
4.4 The Role of the Argentine Crisis
Recent studies on ﬁnancial crises in emerging markets have underlined the ex-
istence of substantial spillover eﬀects and contagion episodes amongst coun-
tries within a given regional area. This feature can be related to common
external macroeconomic shocks, trade and ﬁnancial linkages among countries
or simply a shift in market sentiment. In his analysis of the Mexican crisis,
Calvo (1996) supports the idea of herd behaviour in this context, with agents
withdrawing their exposure from an entire group of interconnected markets
in response to signs of distress in just one of them, rather than bearing the
costs of assessing the true state of the underlying fundamentals relating to
each market.
This interpretation of contagion episodes could provide a potential expla-
nation for the events in Brazil. At the turn of the century, Argentina, the
third largest economy in Latin America and a key trade partner of Brazil,
12had been in recession since 1998 and was registering a growing public-debt-
to-GDP ratio, associated with high political instability, and an overvalued
exchange rate with large current account deﬁcits. In January 2002, the coun-
try devalued its currency abandoning the parity with the USD introduced
under the currency board in 1991. After the country default on public debt,
the currency crisis degenerated into a ﬁnancial one, jeopardised by the asym-
metric pesiﬁcation of bank assets and liabilities with an estimated mismatch
of US$ 54 billion. The result of these events was a loss of conﬁdence in
the domestic authorities and a corresponding currency and bank run in an
attempt to circumvent the introduced restrictions on cash current account
















Figure 5: Sovereign Spreads in Brazil and Argentina
Source: JPMorgan EMBI Global
Despite the stronger fundamentals of the Brazilian economy, its vast stock
of public debt and its vulnerable composition made the country highly ex-
posed to capital ﬂow reversals resulting from changes in market sentiment.
The scene was therefore set for a neighbouring crisis such as the Argentine one
to generate wide spillovers. Although all emerging markets were experiencing
a reduction in foreign investments at the time, due to portfolio reallocation
and changes in risk assessment by investors, a “sudden stop” phenomenon
impacting upon Argentina and Brazil independently does not seem a plau-
sible explanation. Similarities and closeness probably determined a ﬁnancial
contagion eﬀect of its own which self-reinforced the common external shock.
Nevertheless, this view is not shared in academic and institutional circles.
13According to Krueger (2002), “contagion was limited because the Argentine
default was largely expected. Indeed, the crisis seemed to unfold almost in
slow motion. As a result investors had ample opportunity to restructure their
portfolios in advance. With the exception of Uruguay, most Latin American
banks have maintained only a small exposure to Argentina.”. The follow-
ing empirical analysis may be viewed as an attempt to check the validity of
these conclusions, by testing the eﬀect of the Argentine crisis on Brazil, in
terms of increased country risk (Figure 5)16. We therefore included data on
Argentine spreads in our empirical analysis.
4.5 Electoral Expectations and Country Risk
“Brazil has implemented strong and consistent macroeconomic
policies in recent years that have improved fundamentals [...] De-
spite these achievements, the uncertain economic environment
and some concerns about the course of economic policies follow-
ing the upcoming presidential elections have put substantial pres-
sure on ﬁnancial variables” (IMF Press release 02/40, September
2002).
The IMF, as well as a number of other economists, has pointed to the
presidential elections held in October 2002 as one of the main sources of eco-
nomic instability in the country in that period. The drop in net capital ﬂows
has in fact been explained as the result, among other reasons, of investors’
worries concerning a possible shift in macroeconomic policy following the
likely victory of the left-wing candidate, Lula da Silva, in the presidential
election contest, mainly due to Lula’s past declarations in favour of debt
repudiation17.
Following this view, Razin and Sadka (2002) propose a multiple-equilibria
debt-crisis model for Brazil in 2002. The trigger able to coordinate market
expectations and induce creditors to change their beliefs about the country’s
credit worthiness is represented by the forthcoming elections, with a regime
change. Once again, the crucial assumption in the model for the occurrence
of multiple equilibria is the presence of an indexed debt and the dependence
of the country risk on foreign lending. Miller et al. (2003) address the same
issue with a model of Bayesian learning, where the voters learn about the can-
didate’s policy preferences and, above all, his attitude towards debt default.
These authors allow also for contagion eﬀects from Argentina: the events
16See Pericoli-Sbracia [2001] for a comprehensive review of the relevant literature on
contagion.
17See Williamson (2002) and (2003) for a wide examination of Brazilian politics in 2002.
14in the neighbouring country do not cause directly a shift between multiple
equilibria; instead, the country debt repudiation raises default expectations
in Brazil by shifting prior beliefs about the nature of an incoming left-wing
government.
In light of these considerations, we added to our empirical analysis an
examination of the eﬀect of a political variable. In particular, we attempted
to capture public sentiment towards the likely victory of the socialist can-
didate and the resulting worries for the country’s future ﬁscal situation by
using opinion-poll data in the run-up to the presidential election. The net
predominance of Lula’s support during the year preceding the elections is
clearly described by Figure 6, which presents the dynamics of the opinion
polls for the favourite candidates in terms of the percentage of those asked
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Figure 6: Brazilian Political Opinion Polls
Source: IBOPE.
In their paper on the inﬂuence of political instability on economic vulner-
ability, Bussière and Mulder (1999) criticize the use of polls as an indicator
because of their lack of credibility, remarking how many election outcomes
diﬀer signiﬁcantly from polls forecasts. Nevertheless, in the context of this
study, we believe that polls are the most suitable variable, since we are not
looking for exact forecasts of the political outcome, but for the best public
signal, available to foreign investors, of the average Brazilian voter prefer-
ences for the presidential elections.
154.6 What Role for IMF Catalytic Finance?
Finally, we are interested in considering whether the intervention of inter-
national ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs), such as the IMF, can potentially avoid
the jump towards the crisis regime or even preclude the existence of multiple
equilibria.
In this regard, the literature on currency crises has tended to focus on the
role of a common lender of last resort, able to guarantee sovereign debt and
honour it in case of country default. This international guarantee has been
widely criticised in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, because of the strong
moral hazard implications.
A parallel role attributed to IFIs is based on the doctrine of catalytic
ﬁnance: oﬃcial assistance to a country in crisis would not only provide the
necessary liquidity but would contribute to a strengthening of market senti-
ment and hence encourage a return of private-sector funding. Recent work
by Corsetti et al. (2003) provides an explanation of how such a stabilising
mechanism may come into eﬀect, by focusing on the coordination of agents’
expectations and government incentives. The main characteristics of the
model are the insurgence of a liquidity problem, rather than a solvency one;
the eﬀectiveness of IMF support even if the resources available are less than
what is needed to close the ﬁnancing gap; and the possibility of restoring
market conﬁdence and thus generating a strong herding eﬀe c tt h a ti sa b l e
to solve any coordination failures among creditors. As regards potential dis-
tortions in the policymaker behaviour, moral hazard arises only if the true
nature of government is misunderstood. In all other cases, a well-intentioned
policymaker would ﬁnd in the IMF’s liquidity support, and in the private
funding it promotes, the necessary means to realise all the needed reforms.
As suggested by Morris and Shin (2003), a useful integration of the litera-
ture on catalytic ﬁnance would suggest regarding IMF ﬁnancial support as
conditional on earlier actions and the pre-commitment of the government.
Corsetti et al. (2003) refer to the Brazilian events as a likely example
of the eﬀectiveness of IFI intervention in the presence of a country liquidity
problem. The successful exit from the currency and ﬁnancial turmoil of
Summer 2002 is likely to have been determined by the positive reaction of
the markets to the IMF intervention on September 6, with the approval of a
15-month stand-by credit of about US$31 billion. Furthermore, as has been
remarked by the IMF itself, “the commitment that the leading presidential
candidates have given to the core elements of the program already appears
to have helped market conﬁdence”18, thus supporting the view that ﬁnancial
a i dn e e d st ob el i n k e dt oaﬁscally committed government in order to be
18IMF Press release 02/40, September 2002.
16eﬀective and credible.
With reference to the Brazilian experience, IMF intervention–coupled
with the letters of intent of policymakers and the policy declarations of the
presidential candidates–could have had an inﬂuence on the vulnerable debt
situation as well on the political uncertainty in the pre-election period. The
mistrust of Brazilian and international investors regarding the future policies
of a left-wing government could have been more than oﬀset by the support
action from the Fund.
The commitment not to repudiate the sovereign debt and to undertake
all the necessary policy actions to ensure ﬁscal sustainability, underpinned
by the IMF agreement, may have given a strong signal to the public on
the true type of government. Chang (2002) shows how ﬁnancial assistance
programs can have a signiﬁcant impact on domestic politics and, surprisingly,
how commitment to a common ﬁscal policy can especially beneﬁt the pro-
labour party, by making candidates more alike. According to this view, the
hypothesis of the IMF’s intrusion in Brazilian politics, as well as its indirect
support to the outgoing administration’s candidate was totally unjustiﬁed.
From an empirical perspective, these theoretical results oﬀer further pos-
sibilities for investigation. As Miller et al. (2003) indicate, “just as bad news
from Argentina could increase sovereign spreads [...], so arrangements with
t h eI M Fm i g h th a v et h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect”. We therefore decided to intro-
duce into our analysis two “aid and commitment” variables, including both
Argentine and Brazilian news, in order to test whether positive and nega-
tive news concerning IMF intervention, as well as the political commitments
from the current government and the presidential candidates, may have had
as i g n i ﬁcant impact on the country default risk.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Estimates and Interpretation
Given the previous discussion, the candidate variables to include in our analy-
sis in order to explain the level and shifts in the level of the Brazilian sovereign
spread (BRSPR) were the Argentine sovereign spread (ARSPR), a measure
of the perceived probability of Lula’s successes in the presidential election,
as measured by Brazilian opinion polls (LULAOPP), the developed market
high-yield spread (HY) and an aid-and-commitment variable which took the
value −1 when positive declarations were made concerning IMF programs
to Argentina or Brazil (IMF_YES) and zero otherwise, one which took
the value 1 for negative declarations by IMF in this respect–which in the
17event only concerned negative declarations about Argentina for this period–
(IMF_NO)19. Further, because of the high level of Argentine spreads over
the period in question, we investigated whether there was threshold eﬀect
concerning the inﬂuence of the Argentine sovereign spread when ARSPR
breached a 60% threshold.20 See the data appendix for further discussion of
data sources and methods.
Estimations were carried out using daily data for the period November
20, 2001 to October 28, 2002, with a total sample of 245 observations. With
the exceptions of the IMF news dummy variables, all variables were included
with a one-period lag in order to preclude any issues of endogeneity of the
explanatory variables. In the initial estimations, we included all of these
variables in both of the estimated equations (i.e. in both xt and zt). After
sequentially setting statistically insigniﬁcant parameters to zero (using a 5%
nominal signiﬁcance level), we settled on the following preferred speciﬁcation
(where I(.) denotes an indicator variable that takes a value of unity when
the indicated inequality is true, and zero otherwise and estimated standard
































(0.174) IMF_NOt + ut.( 9 )
ut˜N(0,1) (10)
19For merely computational reasons, pessimistic news have a positive sign in the dummy
variable.
20The threshold level of 60% was suggested by estimating a univariate, constant proba-
bilities Markov-switching autoregressive model for ARSPR.
18The results are extremely encouraging in that all of the estimated coeﬃcients
are strongly statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and their sign in each
case accords with our economic intuition. The coeﬃcient of St in equation
(6) shows that a switch into the crisis regime entails a jump of about 5.7%
in the Brazilian sovereign spread. Interestingly, the only other explanatory
variable that was found to be signiﬁcant in this equation was the Argentine
spread. Although this variable does not appear in the ﬁnal latent variable
equation (9), this in fact suggests a strong contagion eﬀect, since a movement
of the Argentine spread above 60% is accompanied by an increase in the
slope coeﬃcient by a factor of about four (from 0.031 to 0.125), indicating a
contribution to the Brazilian spread in excess of 7%.
With regard to the latent variable equation, the estimated coeﬃcient for
the political variable is also strongly signiﬁcant21 and shows, as expected,
a positive sign, in line with the hypothesis of a direct relationship between
Lula’s victory chances and the perceived country default risk. As regards
the global factor variable, the high-yield spread for developed markets has a
strong and signiﬁcant impact on the probability of being in crisis.
We also ﬁnd a positive relationship between the probability of being in
crisis and the IMF dummy variable for negative news, in favour of the idea
that a programme refusal or a pessimistic declaration by the IMF can deeply
aﬀect investors’ beliefs. In particular, the negative-news variable reports
the IMF refusal, on December 5, 2002, to complete the latest review of Ar-
gentina’s IMF supported program, which would have allowed the country to
draw a further US$ 1.3 billion from the IMF22.
The positive IMF news variable was not found to be statistically signif-
icant. This seems to reﬂect a bias of investors’ reaction towards bad news:
while reassuring declarations by political candidates and new agreement with
the IMF appear to have had no notable impact on market sentiment, neg-
ative remarks–which represent sporadic events–can induce strong capital
outﬂows and even trigger a crisis, by decreasing the probability of remaining
in a tranquil state. However, a deeper analysis of the estimated probability
of being in the crisis state, as drawn in ﬁg. 7, shows a temporary tendency of
the crisis state to reverse towards the tranquil one in mid-August 2002: this
trend precedes closely the announcement of the approval of a $30.4 billion
stand-by credit for Brazil and the extension of Argentina’s SRF repayment
by one year, respectively on September 6 and 5. As a result, we cannot
exclude the hypothesis of a leak of information concerning the two IMF in-
21The LULAOPP variable is also economically signiﬁcant, given it is expressed in per-
centage.
22See IMF Survey 30-23.
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Figure 8: Brazilian spreads: actual versus ﬁtted values
The R2 for the regression is equal to 0.9192, indicating that the selected
explanatory variables in the regression account for over 90% of the variation
in the actual Brazilian spreads. The good explanatory power of the speciﬁ-
cation is also illustrated by the plot of the actual versus the ﬁtted values of
BRSPR in ﬁg. 8.
We have shown how the currency and ﬁnancial turmoil of 2002 in Brazil
was triggered by three kinds of signals: political mistrust by foreign investors
20concerning the conduct of the expected winner at the presidential elections,
the behaviour of high-yield spreads in developed markets and negative news
concerning IMF intervention in Argentina. Financial spillovers from Brazil’s
neighbour, Argentina, appear also to have a role in the 2002 events.
6C o n c l u d i n g c o m m e n t s
This paper has investigated the events of 2002 in Brazil, by testing empiri-
cally some of the leading interpretations that have been advanced to account
for the ﬁnancial turmoil that characterised that period. Markov switching
modelling proved an appropriate econometric tool in the analysis of dis-
tress periods. In eﬀect, the possibility of capturing self-fulﬁlling changes in
market behaviour, by means of an endogenous regime-shift selection, allows
researchers to test multiple equilibria models empirically. Our estimates pro-
vide evidence in favour of ﬁnancial contagion from the Argentine crisis as
well as of political uncertainty during the pre-election period in Brazil. In
particular, such instability is interpreted as political mistrust concerning the
future conduct of the left-wing leader with respect to the country’s ﬁscal
obligations. While political uncertainty contributed to the strong jump in
Brazilian bond spreads, the spillover eﬀect from Argentina seems to have af-
fected only the extent of the turmoil in Brazil. The intervention of the IMF,
coupled with the ﬁscal pre-commitments of the domestic authorities and the
declarations of the presidential candidates, appeared instead to have a re-
verting eﬀect on country risk. Nevertheless, while positive news do not show
up as a signiﬁcant factor in avoiding a crisis, negative news and declarations
seem to have a deep impact on investors’ sentiment and to be determinant
in the probability of switching into a crisis regime.
However, this study is by no means exhaustive. Data availability rep-
resents the main limitation of the analysis: the use of high-frequency data
allows a better representation of the dynamics of investors’ behaviour, but
reduces the quantity of variables available at the same time. The absence of
daily observations for foreign reserves as well as for other fundamental vari-
ables excludes the possibility of including these variables in the estimations.
In addition, even at lower frequency, there is still a diﬃculty in obtaining
country-level data on capital ﬂow movements, while these are widely avail-
able for trade statistics. Finally, the chronology of political events and IMF
n e w sw o u l dn e e dt ob ec o m p i l e dw i t hr e f e r e n c et ot h ee ﬀective day of dis-
closure of the information to the markets, in order to take account of the
possible existence of “insider trading” and information leaks, given the large
numbers of people and institutions involved in the decision process.
21Finally, the results of our study suggest a number of policy considera-
tions. The signiﬁcant role of contagion between South American economies
clearly needs to be taken constantly into account by IFIs, notably the IMF,
in their intervention strategies, perhaps by means of more eﬀective policy
coordination in the region. Moreover, the potential for IMF declarations and
agreements to act as a common public signal able to coordinate market ex-
pectations and hence generate a catalytic-ﬁnance eﬀect strongly encourages
further research on this topic.
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25A Appendix: Data Deﬁnitions and Sources
A.1 Sovereign spreads
The data source for bond spreads is the JP Morgan Chase’s Emerging Mar-
kets Global Bond Index (EMBI Global). According to JP Morgan’s method-
ology brief23, the EMBI Global includes U.S.-dollar-denominated Brady bonds,
Eurobonds, traded loans and local market debt instruments issued by sovereign
and quasi-sovereign entities. The weight of each individual issue in the
country-by-country index is determined on the basis of market-capitalisation.
The use of a bond-spread index rather than the diﬀerence between an indi-
vidual sovereign bond yield and the US Treasury bill yield closest to it in
issue date and maturity allows for a better homogeneity of the data sample
for diﬀerent countries over time .The EMBI Global Spreads are available at
daily frequency since January 1, 1998 for Argentina and Brazil (These two
variables are referred to in the analysis as ARSPR and BRSPR).
A.2 Developed Market high-yield Spread
The data source for this variable is the JP Morgan Chase’s Developed Market
high-yield Summary Spread to Worst. The JPMorgan Developed Market HY
Index represents all US$ denominated corporate issues, with issuers domiciled
in countries labelled as industrial by JPMorgan’s Economic Research Group.
The spread is given by the diﬀerence between the high-yield and yield of the
Treasuries. Issues included in the index must be rated ”5B” or lower. That
is, the highest Moody’s/S&P ratings are Baa1/BB+ or Ba1/BBB+. The
inception date of the index is January 1994.
A.3 Political variable
Data on opinion polls during the 2002 presidential electoral campaign in
Brazil have been obtained from IBOPE (Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião
Pública e Estatística). Daily observations have been linearly interpolated
from the data series available, from November 20, 2001 to October 28, 2002,
with a total sample of 245 observations (The variable is named LULAOPP
in the analysis). In particular, the following list of Pesquisas De Opinião
Pública Sobre Assuntos Políticos/ Administrativos (Public Opinion Surveys
on Political/Administrative Aﬀairs) has been considered:
23J.P.Morgan (1999)
26OPP169 19/nov/2001; OPP203 19/dez/2001; OPP006 21/jan/2002;
OPP035 11/mar/2002; OPP051 18/mar/2002; OPP079 21/apr/2002;
OPP085 21/apr/2002; OPP107 19/mai/2002; OPP135 19/jun/2002;
OPP172 07/jul/2002; OPP184 14/jul/2002; OPP202 23/jul/2002;
OPP218 30/jul/2002; OPP225 08/ago/2002; OPP235 13/ago/2002;
OPP249 20/ago/2002; OPP279 27/ago/2002; OPP305 03/set/2002;
OPP329 09/set/2002; OPP351 17/set/2002; OPP357 20/set/2002;
OPP385 24/set/2002; OPP450 01/out/2002; OPP422 05/out/2002;
OPP438 6/out/2002; Result 1st round; OPP469 15/out/2002; OPP513
22/out/2002; OPP524 26/out/2002; OPP537 27/out/2002; Result
2nd round.
A.4 Aid and commitment variable
In the analysis we consider two diﬀerent “aid and commitment”
variables. The ﬁrst dummy variable (IMF_YES) takes a value
equal to minus one each time the IMF released optimistic decla-
rations regarding possible or agreed supported programs to Brazil
or Argentina. The variable also includes the issue dates of letter
of intents by the Brazilian national authorities. In addition, news
concerning the disbursement delay of the IMF to Argentina on
December 5, 2001 and any related event has been included in an
another dummy variable (IMF_NO), with a value of one. The
main news sources were the IMF website and major Brazilian
newspapers and news and information agencies. For the pur-
poses of the analysis and according to the other variable sample-
periods, we used observations from between November 20 2001
through October 28 2002, for a total of twenty news items for
Brazil and eleven for Argentina. The events captured by the two
variables are listed below by country and typology of news.
Positive news:
Brazil
19 November 2001 Statement by Mr. Pedro Malan, Minister of
Finance of Brazil, at the International Monetary and Financial Com-
mittee, Ottawa, November 17, 2001
30 November 2001 Brazil Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Eco-
nomic Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding
2723 January 2002 News Brief: IMF Completes First Review of
Stand-by Arrangement with Brazil
28 January 2002 IMF Survey: IMF approves review of Brazil’s
performance;
07 February 2002 Public Information Notice: IMF Concludes 2001
Article IV Consultation with Brazil
04 March 2002 Brazil Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic
Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, March 4,
2002
26 March 2002 News Brief: IMF Completes Second Review of
Stand-By Arrangement with Brazil
22 April 2002 Statement by Mr. Pedro Malan, Minister of Finance
of Brazil to the International Monetary and Financial Committee,
Washington, D. C., April, 20, 2002
27 May 2002 IMF Survey: Brazil positioned to speed up growth;
05 June 2002 Brazil — Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic
and Financial Policies, Technical Memorandum of Understanding
14 June 2002 Brazil — Letter of Intent
18 June 2002 News Brief: IMF Completes Third Review of Stand-
By Arrangement with Brazil
21 June 2002 Lula’s ”Carta ao Povo Brasileiro”
24 June 2002 IMF Survey: Brazil can draw $10 billion;
23 July 2002 Lula’s ”Compromisso com a soberania o emprego e
a seguranca do povo brasileiro”
07 August 2002 News Brief: IMF Managing Director Köhler Con-
ﬁrms Agreement with Brazil
29 August 2002 Brazil — Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Eco-
nomic Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding
06 September 2002 Press Release: IMF Approves US$30.4 Billion
Stand-By Credit for Brazil
16 September 2002 IMF Survey: Brazil loan;
30 September 2002 IMFC Statement by Mr. Pedro Malan, Min-
i s t e ro fF i n a n c eo fB r a z i l ,o nb e h a l fo ft h eC o n s t i t u e n c yc o m p r i s -
ing Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti,
Panama, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago
2828 October 2002 News Brief: IMF Managing Director Köhler Con-
gratulates Brazil’s President-Elect
Argentina
16 January 2002 Press Release: IMF Extends Argentina’s SRF
Repayment by One Year
28 January 2002 IMF Survey: IMF extends Argentine debt dead-
line;
08 February 2002 News Brief: IMF’s Köhler Welcomes Remes
Visit, says IMF Working Closely with Argentina
13 February 2002 News Brief: IMF’s Köhler: Good Start to New
Relationship with Argentina
04 March 2002 News Brief: IMF Sending Mission to Argentina
11 March 2002 IMF Survey: IMF mission to Argentina;
15 March 2002 News Brief: Press Statement by the IMF Mission
to Argentina
25 March 2002 IMF Survey: IMF statement on Argentina
10 April 2002 IMF Encourages Argentine Reforms, By Thomas
C. Dawson, Director, Ext. Rel. Dept, IMF; Introductory Remarks on
the Role of the IMF Mission in Argentina by Anoop Singh, Dir. for
Special Operations, IMF
17 April 2002 Statement by the IMF Mission to Argentina
21 May 2002 News Brief: IMF Managing Director meets Argentine
Economy Minister, Board extends repayment of SRF
28 June 2002 News Brief: IMF’s Köhler Welcomes Progress in
Talks with Argentina
08 July 2002 IMF Survey: Köhler on Argentina;
10 July 2002 News Brief: IMF Managing Director Horst Köhler
Announces Advisory Group on Argentina
15 July 2002 Press Release: IMF Extends Argentina’s SRF Re-
payment by One Year
22 July 2002 IMF Survey: Advisory panel for Argentina;
29 July 2002 News Brief: IMF Managing Director Köhler Wel-
comes Independent Advisors’ Report on Argentina
05 August 2002 IMF Survey: Krueger on Argentina;
2905 September 2002 Press Release: IMF Extends Argentina’s SRF
Repayment by One Year
Negative news:
Argentina
05 December 2001 Transcript of a Press Brieﬁng by Thomas C.
Dawson, Director, External Relations Department, IMF
06 December 2001 Transcript of a Press Brieﬁng by Thomas C.
Dawson, Director, External Relations Department, IMF
10 December 2001 IMF Survey: Argentine disbursement delayed
30